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W hen a counterparty to a commercial contract refuses to perform, an important consideration before initiating a 
lawsuit is whether a court will enter a preliminary injunction com-
pelling the counterparty to continue to perform its obligations pend-
ing trial. This is particularly important in supply-chain disputes, 
where buyers often rely on a sole-source supplier for just-in-time 
deliveries of specialized goods. While the four-factor standard for 
preliminary injunctive relief is well known, how the standard should 
be applied is not well developed. For example: Do courts balance 
these factors? How strong a showing of a “likeli hood of success” is 
required? What qualifi es as “irreparable harm”? Uncertainty regard-
ing the answers to these questions can make it diffi cult for poten-
tial litigants to assess their positions. But this need not be the case. 
Careful analysis of Michigan caselaw provides additional guidance 
on how potential litigants and courts should analyze these factors.
Business L i t igat ion
Michigan’s Preliminary-Injunction Standard
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the sta-
tus quo so that the parties’ rights may be determined without 
injury to either in the interim.1 Michigan’s preliminary-injunction 
standard is well known:
Whether a preliminary injunction should issue is determined by 
a four-factor analysis: [1] harm to the public interest if an injunc-
tion issues; [2] whether harm to the applicant in the absence of a 
stay outweighs the harm to the opposing party if a stay is granted; 
[3] the strength of the applicant’s demonstration that the appli-
cant is likely to prevail on the merits; and [4] demonstration that 
the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if a preliminary in-
junction is not granted.2
Injunctive Relief
By Daniel N. Adams and Daniel W. Linna Jr.
T H E  AVA I L A B I L I T Y  O F
I N  C O M M E R C I A L  D I S P U T E S
Clarifying Michigan’s Preliminary-Injunction Standard
Fast Facts
Michigan appellate courts have not resolved certain key questions 
associated with the application of the well-known four-factor 
standard for injunctive relief.
These open questions can create uncertainty, particularly in 
time-sensitive supply-chain litigation.
Michigan Supreme Court precedent offers support for the conclusion 
that courts may balance the four factors in certain cases.
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Courts often add the gloss that “[i]njunctive relief is an extraordi-
nary remedy that issues only when justice requires, there is no 
adequate remedy at law, and there exists a real and imminent 
danger of irreparable injury.”3
Are Michigan Trial Courts Permitted 
to Balance the Injunctive-Relief Factors?
Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit apply a similar four-factor 
test when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, 
and balance the factors to determine whether the movant is enti-
tled to injunctive relief.4 Michigan state courts have not expressly 
adopted a balancing approach. Balancing, however, is not incon-
sistent with the often-cited standard established by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in Mich State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental 
Health (hereinafter MSEA). Additionally, support for a balancing ap-
proach can be found in cases predating MSEA, such as Niedzialek 
v Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers & Cosmetologists’ Interna-
tional Union of America, Local No. 552.5
In Niedzialek, the plaintiff sought to enjoin members of a local 
union from picketing outside his shop because it was disrupting 
his business.6 The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for an 
injunction.7 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court observed that, although the plaintiff’s likelihood of success 
on the merits could not “be decided until there is a hearing on 
the merits,” it was clear that if “the picketing is continued in the 
interim until a hearing on the merits, plaintiff will suffer irrep arable 
injury.”8 Moreover, granting the injunction and enjoining the union 
from picketing would not cause “any permanent or irrep arable 
injury to [the union], even if the ultimate determination should 
be that the picketing was lawful.” 9 Thus, although the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success remained unclear from the lower court rec-
ord, the Court held that “[i]t is the settled policy of this Court un-
der such circumstances to grant to a litigant who is threatened 
with irreparable injury temporary injunctive relief and thereby 
preserve the original status quo.” 10
Niedzialek establishes that a court should accord greater weight 
to the irreparable-harm balancing factor and grant an injunction 
if (1) the facts remain unclear or the merits cannot be determined 
without a full hearing but the moving party shows threatened 
irrep arable injury and (2) the party opposing the injunction makes 
no showing that it will sustain material ultimate damage or dep-
rivation of rights.11
The balancing approach that fl ows from Niedzialek could help 
resolve motions for injunctive relief where the strength of the mov-
ant’s showing of a “likelihood of success” on the merits appears 
to be a close question, particularly when the case is in its initial 
stages.12 Applying this approach, if the movant shows threatened 
irreparable injury and the nonmovant makes no such showing, the 
trial court should enter a preliminary injunction so long as the suit 
presents issues of controverted merit. Given this fl exibility, a trial 
court may be able to eliminate the need for an evidentiary hear-
ing to attempt to determine the strength of the movant’s case on 
the merits. This is particularly important in the early stages of a 
complex commercial case when conducting an evidentiary hear-
ing is not only ineffi cient for the parties and the court, but also 
just as likely to further confuse as it is to clarify the issues.
The Success-on-the-Merits Factor: 
Is There a Clear Standard?
While certain success is clearly not the standard, Michigan ap-
pellate courts have not spoken with clarity on how lower courts 
should analyze the success-on-the-merits factor. In many cases, 
Michigan courts have interpreted MSEA as requiring lower courts to 
analyze “the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the mer-
its.”13 But in some cases, Michigan courts have suggested that a party 
must demonstrate that it “is likely to prevail on the merits.”14
These variations may not refl ect a substantive disagreement 
on the applicable legal standard. Like Michigan state courts, fed-
eral courts also apply a bewildering variety of formulations of 
this factor, but these “verbal differences do not seem to refl ect 
substantive disagreement” on the applicable standard—i.e., that 
a plaintiff “must present a prima facie case but need not show 
that he is certain to win.”15
Still, these cases suggest that courts may be applying two and 
possibly even three different standards. To evaluate “the likeli-
hood that the applicant will prevail on the merits” suggests a fl ex-
ible standard that is consistent with the MSEA “strength of dem-
onstration” language.16 On the other hand, requiring a moving 
party to show that it is “likely” to prevail suggests something more 
rigid and mathematical—that a movant must meet a clear “more 
likely than not” threshold to merit an injunction.17
No Michigan court appears to have addressed this potential 
inconsistency. Should a court have occasion to do so, the af fi r-
mation of a fl exible, MSEA-type standard seems likely. A rigid, 
mechanical standard is inconsistent with the nature of equitable 
remedies, which “[do] not follow automatically on the establish-
ment of a strict legal right,” but instead apply where the remedy 
is “compatible with the equities of the case.”18 Moreover, the “likely 
to prevail” standard thrusts upon the litigant, who may be seek-
ing injunctive relief before any discovery has been taken, a daunt-
ing evidentiary burden at an early stage of the case. The modest 
goal of the success-on-the-merits factor—determining whether 
the movant has pleaded a claim “on which he might ultimately 
obtain relief”—does not demand the imposition of an exacting, 
more-likely-than-not standard.19
THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
IS TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO SO THAT 
THE PARTIES’ RIGHTS MAY BE DETERMINED 
WITHOUT INJURY TO EITHER IN THE INTERIM.
plaintiff unless the plaintiff agreed to pay a higher price.23 The 
court, applying Michigan law, denied the plaintiff’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction because, among other things, the plaintiff 
had not established that it would suffer irreparable harm.24 This 
element, the court held, is not met if the buyer can avoid irrepa-
rable harm by paying the seller’s demand, can afford to pay the 
demand, and can seek a judgment for money damages.25
Michigan appellate courts have not extensively analyzed this 
issue—i.e., whether the buyer’s ability to pay the requested price 
increase precludes a fi nding of irreparable harm. Nevertheless, 
Thyssenkrupp and cases like it may be distinguishable where, 
for example, paying the price increase will cause “immeasur-
able injury” to the buyer’s reputation or leave it with “a negative 
cash fl ow and insuffi cient funds to operate its business.”26 Ad-
ditionally, a buyer can show irreparable harm when collecting 
on a judgment for an invalid price increase would be diffi cult 
or impossible.27
Conclusion
Michigan caselaw offers support for the proposition that courts 
can balance the preliminary-injunction factors to obtain an equi-
table result; that a litigant need only demonstrate some “likeli-
hood” of success to merit injunctive relief; and that buyers in time-
sensitive supply disputes can and do obtain orders compelling 
sellers to continue to perform during the pendency of a case. Still, 
Michigan higher courts have not clearly resolved some key issues 
associated with the application of the preliminary-injunction stan-
dard. These uncertainties are most likely to matter at the mar-
gins—e.g., when a party must seek injunctive relief early in the 
litigation without the benefi t of discovery and where the merits 
of the case are complicated or do not clearly favor one side. In 
these cases, assessing the risks of litigation and the likelihood of 
obtaining injunctive relief becomes more diffi cult. ■
The Irreparable-Harm Element
A party can show irreparable injury by demonstrating that the 
absence of an injunction will cause “a noncompensable injury for 
which there is no legal measurement of damages or for which 
damages cannot be determined with a suffi cient degree of cer-
tainty.”20 In the commercial context, courts have found irrepara-
ble harm where, for example, the moving party will lose custom-
ers, goodwill, or business.21
When a seller refuses to ship unique goods in a just-in-time 
supply-chain case, the buyer often alleges that the interruption 
in supply will force it to cease operations, resulting not only in 
catastrophic damages (which the seller may not be able to sat-
isfy), but also the loss of customers and goodwill—hallmarks of 
irreparable harm. In some cases, however, the seller asserts it has 
refused to supply goods because the buyer has refused to pay a 
price increase required or permitted under the parties’ contract. 
In these situations, sellers assert that there is no irreparable harm 
because the buyer can simply pay the price increase, continue to 
receive goods, and then sue the seller for return of the disputed 
price increase.
This was the court’s holding in Thyssenkrupp Fabco Corp v 
Heidtman Steel Prods, Inc, CA.22 In Thyssenkrupp, a steel supplier, 
citing higher commodity prices, refused to ship material to the 
Business L i t igat ion  — The Availabilit y of Injunctive Relief in Commercial Disputes
Michigan Bar Journal      February 2012
 IN THE COMMERCIAL CONTEXT, COURTS 
HAVE FOUND IRREPARABLE HARM WHERE, 
FOR EXAMPLE, THE MOVING PARTY WILL LOSE 
CUSTOMERS, GOODWILL, OR BUSINESS.
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13. See, e.g., Northern Warehousing, Inc v Dep’t of Education, 475 Mich 859;  
714 NW2d 287 (2006) (citing MSEA, n 2 supra at 157–158).
14. See, e.g., Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 96 n 27; 701 NW2d  
684 (2005).
15. See 11A Wright, Miller, Kane & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed 
2010) §2948.3; cf. Henry v Dow Chem Co, n 13 supra at 96 n 27 (stating that 
the purpose of this factor is to show “whether the movant has pleaded a claim on 
which he might ultimately obtain relief”) (emphasis added).
16. See Verhelle v Eveland, 347 Mich 612, 619; 81 NW2d 397 (1957) (interpreting 
the term “likelihood of success” in context of application to organize a bank as  
“a probability of success” or a “favorable chance of success”).
17. See Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 22; 506 NW2d 816 (1993) 
(defining “likely” as “Probable. In all probability. Likely is a word of general  
usage and common understanding, broadly defined as of such nature or so 
circumstantial as to make something probable and having a better chance of 
existing or occurring than not.”) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 925 (6th ed 
1990)) (internal citations omitted).
18. 43A Corpus Juris Secundum Injunctions (2004) §80; see also Oosterhouse v 
Brummel, 343 Mich 283, 289; 72 NW2d 6 (1955) (stating that “[c]ourts of 
equity . . .grant or withhold injunctive relief depending upon the accomplishment  
of an equitable result in the light of all of the circumstances surrounding the 
particular case.”).
19. See Henry v Dow Chem Co, n 14 supra at 96 n 27 (stating that the purpose of 
this factor is to show “whether the movant has pleaded a claim on which he might 
ultimately obtain relief.”) (emphasis added).
20. Thermatool Corp v Borzym, 227 Mich App 366, 377; 575 NW2d 334 (1998); 
see also Almetals, Inc v Wickeder Westfalenstahl, GmbH, No. 08-10109, 2008 
WL 2026122, at *8; 2008 US Dist LEXIS 87403, at *21 (ED Mich, 2008) 
(citation omitted) (granting permanent injunction where aggrieved party could not 
afford price increase and had no alternative source of clad metal and thus 
damages would be incalculable and irremediable).
21. Mich Bell Telephone Co v Engler, 257 F3d 587, 599 (CA 6, 2001); Ross-Simons 
of Warwick, Inc v Baccarat, Inc, 102 F3d 12, 20 (CA 1, 1996) (“loss of a. . .
product line may create a threat of irreparable injury if it is likely that customers  
(or prospective customers) will turn to competitors who do not labor under the 
same handicap.”); see also AK Steel Corp v Colton, unpublished opinion of the  
US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued November 30, 2001 
(Docket No. 01-74279); 2001 WL 1636957, at *3; 2001 US Dist LEXIS 20314, 
at *14–15 (finding irreparable harm and granting injunction where movant would 
suffer competitive injury and loss of goodwill, and such injuries would be difficult 
to quantify); Kyklos Bearing Int’l v General Motors LLC, unpublished per curiam 
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 10, 2011 (Docket No. 301881) 
(affirming the trial court’s holding that GM would suffer irreparable harm if an 
injunction was not issued compelling supplier to perform).
22. Thyssenkrupp Fabco Corp v Heidtman Steel Prods, Inc, CA, No. 04-74331  
(ED Mich 2005); see also Ventra Ionia Main, LLC v Sabic Innovative  
Plastics US, LLC, unpublished opinion of the Oakland County Circuit Court,  
issued July 9, 2010 (Docket No. 10-111700-CK); Intermet Corp v PBR Int’l  
USA LTD, CA, unpublished opinion of the Oakland County Circuit Court,  
issued April 17, 2007 (Docket No. 07-081811-CK).
23. Thyssenkrupp, n 22 supra at *3.
24. Id. at *8–9.
25. Id.
26. Almetals, n 20 supra at *21–22.
27. See, e.g., Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc v Shoshone River  
Power, Inc, 805 F2d 351, 355 (CA 10 1986) (“Difficulty in collecting  
a damage judgment may support a claim of irreparable injury.”); Calton,  
Specific Performance, in Michigan Contract Law (Trentacosta, rev ed, 2010), 
§14.6, p 343 (“[Specific performance is appropriate] [e]ven if a legal  
remedy such as an award of damages might nominally be available but  
would be futile because the defendant is insolvent or has demonstrated that  
he or she will continue to infringe on plaintiff’s rights.”).
FOOTNOTES
 1. Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Mich v Dep’t of Community Health, 231 Mich App 
647, 655–656; 588 NW2d 133 (1999); Niedzialek v Journeymen Barbers, 
Hairdressers & Cosmetologists’ International Union of America, Local No. 552, 
331 Mich 296; 49 NW2d 273 (1951).
 2. Mich State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152, 158–159;  
365 NW2d 93 (1984) (citation omitted).
 3. Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v City of Pontiac, 482 Mich 1, 8;  
753 NW2d 595 (2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
 4. See, e.g., Performance Unlimited, Inc v Questar Publishers, Inc, 52 F3d 1373, 
1381 (CA 6, 1995); In re Delorean Motor Co, 755 F2d 1223, 1228–1229  
(CA 6, 1985).
 5. Niedzialek, n 1 supra.
 6. Id. at 298–299.
 7. Id. at 297.
 8. Id. at 300.
 9. Id.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. See 10A Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed, rev vol 2005), §76:137, p 930 
(stating that “[i]t is an abuse of discretion to deny a temporary injunction where the 
plaintiff shows threatened irreparable injury and the defendant makes no showing 
that he or she will sustain material ultimate damage or deprivation of rights.” 
(citing, among other cases, Niedzialek, n 1 supra )); see also Steggles v Nat’l 
Discount Corp, 326 Mich 44, 49; 39 NW2d 237 (1949) (stating that “[t]he 
general rule is that whenever courts have found a mandatory injunction essential to 
the preservation of the status quo and a serious inconvenience and loss would 
result to plaintiff and there would be no great loss to defendant, they will grant it.”).
12. See, e.g., Kyklos Bearing Int’l v General Motors LLC, unpublished opinion  
of the Oakland County Circuit Court, issued December 8, 2010 (Docket No. 
10-111554-CK) (stating, from the bench, that Michigan courts are not required to 
balance the preliminary-injunction factors: “That may be the case in the federal 
system, but that’s not the case here in state court.”), rev’d, unpublished order  
of the Court of Appeals, entered February 10, 2011 (Docket No. 301881) 
(granting motion for peremptory reversal and entering a preliminary injunction 
pending trial without addressing whether trial courts should balance the 
preliminary-injunction factors).
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